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Abstract The collapse of confidence in anonymization
(sometimes also known as de-identification) as a robust
approach for preserving the privacy of personal data has
incited an outpouring of new approaches that aim to fill
the resulting trifecta of technical, organizational, and
regulatory privacy gaps left in its wake. In the latter
category, and in large part due to the growth of Big
Data–driven biomedical research, falls a growing chorus
of calls for criminal and penal offences to sanction
wrongful re-identification of Banonymized^ data. This
chorus cuts across the fault lines of polarized privacy
law scholarship that at times seems to advocate privacy
protection at the expense of Big Data research or vice
versa. Focusing on Big Data in the context of biomedi-
cine, this article surveys the approaches that criminal or
penal lawmight take toward wrongful re-identification of
health data. It contextualizes the strategies within their
respective legal regimes as well as in relation to emerging
privacy debates focusing on personal data use and data
linkage and assesses the relative merit of criminalization.
We conclude that this approach suffers from several flaws
and that alternative social and legal strategies to deter
wrongful re-identification may be preferable.
Keywords Anonymization . Re-identification . Data
protection . Criminal law. Big data .Medicine
Introduction
A new form of data protection prohibition is arriving.
Since 2010, a range of scholars and lawmakers, partic-
ularly in the biomedical context, have gravitated toward
calling for criminal penalties for wrongful re-
identification of anonymized data.
This trend has three striking features. First, it has
emerged rapidly and simultaneously across numerous
jurisdictions around the globe, primarily in response
to damaging reports of new data breaches and of re-
identification of data that had been presumed to have
been adequately anonymized. Second, in contrast with
other recent data protection legislative trends, such as
the adoption of breach notification rules, re-
identification criminalization appears to be a less-
natural extension of fundamental data protection prin-
ciples. Instead, it represents a new principle overlap-
ping significantly with elements of the existing data
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legislative treatment of the topic have been cursory,
likely because it was catalyzed in response to indi-
vidual crises or patterns thereof, rather than emanating
from the theoretical or empirical evolution of data
protection.
This article advances this discussion through a
sustained, critical appraisal of criminal re-identification
penalties. Because the trend is international, the analysis
is comparative. A measure of specificity is inevitably
lost as data protection regimes, although they share
important common features, do vary significantly inter-
nationally, much like the broader legal frameworks
within which they are inscribed. But the underlying
issues in question go to the conceptual heart of data
protection, especially the nature of the relationship be-
tween the technical and legal means of data protection—
in particular how one might be substituted for the oth-
er—a topic recently developed in the Breyer case in
Europe that found dynamic IP addresses may qualify
as personal data (Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(C-582/14) [2016] ECJ).
The analysis follows in six parts. This article first
relates the developments underpinning the wave of in-
terest in criminal penalties for wrongful re-identifica-
tion. It next identifies diverse proponents that these new
penalties have attracted. Third, it examines explicit reg-
ulation of re-identification in general, abstracted from
the criminal or other nature of the enforcement mecha-
nism. Fourth, it analyses the scope or breadth of actors
and activities to which the sanction can apply. Fifth, it
discusses the role of the intensity of the criminal sanc-
tion in the data protection context in general and in the
re-identification context in particular. Sixth, it analyses a
recent legislative bill that would explicitly criminalize
re-identification, which was introduced in Australia at
the end of 2016 following a scandal involving the re-
identification of clinical data published for research
purposes. Finally, we conclude with our assessment of
this criminalization trend, noting that at this time its
drawbacks likely outweigh its putative benefits, and
ultimately advocate alternative strategies such as com-
munity sanctions or punitive damages or fines calibrated
for deterrence.
I. Catalysts
Numerous voices are calling for the criminalization of
wrongful re-identification to enable health benefits
through Big Data analysis (e.g. National Data
Guardian for Health and Care 2016; Pilgrim 2016;
Gellman 2011; Nass, Levit, and Gostin 2009). The idea
is to provide a convincing answer to the privacy con-
cerns that might otherwise compromise medical break-
throughs enabled by analysing large or linked datasets
of personal data in order to ensure that these benefits are
neither passed up nor even delayed. Criminalization
advocates have not built their case by providing exam-
ples of important, real-life medical advances that could
only have been achieved through Big Data analysis nor
have they described how any potential benefits will be
distributed between different social groups and classes.
Rather, they tend to refer to missed speculative break-
throughs and opportunities.
This BBig Data Benefits^ argument is nonetheless
backed by considerable moral force. Scholars who
fall strongly on the side of privacy protection even
appear prepared to carve out exceptions where health
research is at stake, such as leading security expert
Bruce Schneier (Schneier 2015). In the law and
policy field, Big Data Benefits advocates have also
recently set their sights on transforming this moral
force into a legal one. The human right Bto share in
scientific advancement and its benefits,^ as set forth
in article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, is being interpreted in the literature as facil-
itating researcher access to health-related personal
data to further operationalize the open data and open
science movements (Knoppers et al. 2014). Indeed,
those deemed to unduly restrict access to data, par-
ticularly those generated through public funds, may
be seen as Bdata hoarders^ undermining the values
of solidarity and altruism (Prainsack 2015).
Improving human health is as uncontroversial an
objective as one is likely to encounter. In weighing
benefits and risks when deciding how to go about doing
so, a discussion that remains conspicuously unexplored,
however, is the people to whom the benefits of any
given research initiative flow in particular. Does invest-
ment in a given emerging healthcare technology or
strategy (personalized medicine, for instance) increase
or decrease existing disparities in healthcare quality or
access? Does it increase or decrease the efficiency and
proportion of benefits that flow to the public-at-large in
relation to private sector actors such as insurers and drug
companies?
But the primary countervailing considerations where
Big Data medical science is concerned—and the ones
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this article discusses—are privacy and data protection,1
which have taken on a fundamental importance and are
the object of increased anxiety. In terms of security, for
example, B[i]n 2015, the US health sector was affected
by some of the largest data breaches in its history,^ in
which over 100 million healthcare records were stolen
(Australian Government Productivity Commission
2016, 223). The number of patients no longer willing
to freely disclose their medical information to healthcare
providers for fear of such breaches has rapidly increased
(Black Book Market Research 2017). The perceived
economic value of Big Data may now be in decline as
a result of the economic consequences of these inci-
dents. There is increased potential for Big Data to be-
come a Btoxic asset,^ whose value is optimized by
erasing it once the purpose for which it has been col-
lected has been fulfilled (Schneier 2016), including
when it remains stored yet largely unexploited (Bdark
data^).
In 2015 and 2016, hospitals were also targeted spe-
cifically by ransomware exploits that not only extracted
large payments from the institutions by blackmail but
that also caused incidental service outages (Hennigan
and Bennett 2016). Ransomware has since been made
illegal in California, where many of these incidents
occurred (Fisher 2017). Though it is difficult to obtain
accurate statistics—companies are loath to publicly dis-
cuss having been compromised—an IBM study found
that 70 per cent of businesses infected by ransomware
made payments as a means to restore their access to their
own systems (IBM 2016).
Actors in the informal economy have no monopoly
on privacy concerns. The broad scope of indiscriminate
surveillance by much more powerful actors, govern-
ments and corporations, of course, was confirmed by
Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2012. Risks including
these have led to intensified concerns from patients and
research participants about secondary sharing of their
data (Robertson 2013).
Until recently, the tension between robust data pro-
tection and Big Data Benefits was nonetheless felt to be
reconcilable without much compromise. Because the
effectiveness of scientific and Big Data analysis do not
generally depend on the individual identities of their
subjects, by anonymizing the data—that is, irreversibly
disassociating the subjects’ identities—the leading cur-
rent of thought held that use and disclosure could be free
of any significant risk of adverse privacy conse-
quences.2 Even in the context of rich, multidimensional
data, advocates could once be found favouring the idea
that genomic data is anonymized when no direct identi-
fiers are included, such as a person’s name or telephone
number (Nietfeld 2007; Lowrance 2002, 34).
But practical anonymization has proven more elusive
than hoped. Latanya Sweeney’s pioneering work dem-
onstrating the ease of re-identifying Bde-identified^ re-
search participants (Sweeney 2000), was successively
built upon by an array of clever research, which was
surveyed in the landmark legal study of the question by
Paul Ohm (Ohm 2010). These revelations have mortally
wounded the conception of anonymization as a robust
privacy-preserving approach.
Genomic re-identification experts, in particular, have
demonstrated a series of surprising results including the
ability to use aggregated genetic variant data to deter-
mine whether or not a given research participant had the
disease being studied (Homer et al. 2008), to link a
person’s bioinformatic profile with their name in an
online genealogy database (Gymrek et al. 2013), and to
re-identify a research participant using only 25 of their
genetic variants, selected at random (Cai et al. 2015).
In light of these recent discoveries, anonymization’s
defenders have had to reassess their claims. A measure
of debate—at times fierce—has persisted about the con-
tinued relevance of anonymization (El Emam and
Arbuckle 2014; Sweeney 2015). This divergence of
experts should itself serve as a caution against assertions
of reliable forecasts of re-identification risk forecasts,
1 Although the focus of this article is effectively on data protection,
because the English-speaking world often uses the more vague term
Bprivacy^ even when it is essentially referring to data protection, we
have referenced both concepts here. Data protection frameworks
emerged from regulation of the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal data that began to emerge around 1970. Privacy, on the other
hand, includes a number of additional areas of the law, such as security
against unreasonable search and seizure by police, the right to one’s
image, duties of confidentiality, and prohibitions against
eavesdropping, to name but a few.
2 This said, some scholars argue that reconciliation between data
protection and Big Data benefits is possible without invoking
anonymization as the bridging strategy (Laurie and Sethi 2013). For
example, legal scholar Mark Taylor (University of Sheffield) has
argued that confidential patient data may be used for public policy
objectives if persons are provided (1) reasons to expect the use of data;
(2) reasons to accept that use; and (3) that the data uses respect patient
preferences. Taylor argues that through this Btriple test^ of Bexpect,
accept, and respect,^ legitimate invocations of both privacy and the
public interest can serve to protect and constrain one another (Sorbie
2016).
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apart from when using specific measurable techniques
such as differential privacy, which adds noise to data
until it is unidentifiable according to a certain threshold
metric. Anonymization’s detractors have been more cat-
egorical in asserting that Bthe privacy risk of data that is
protected by ad hoc de-identification is not just un-
known, but unknowable^ (Narayanan, Huey, and
Felten 2015, 1) and that ultimately B[a]nonymity does
not solve ethical problems relative to privacy in a big
data age^ (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 51).
The inevitable technical uncertainty has been need-
lessly exacerbated by a proliferation of technical terms
to describe data identifiability and the adoption of con-
tradictory definitions by a variety of entities (Phillips
and Knoppers 2016). Among the still-all-too-common
consequences are, on the one hand, patently inadequate
Banonymization,^ such as merely removing names
while leaving home addresses intact (McLean 2016),
and, on the other, needless barriers to medical re-
searchers’ access to data sets for analysis (Council of
Canadian Academies 2015).
The discussion of the recent explosion of healthcare
data breaches mentioned above needs to be qualified
when we come to a discussion of the health research
sector, however. To date, extremely few breaches by
malicious actors have come to light (Laurie et al.
2014). Publicized re-identification attacks seem to be
limited to those developed by security researchers seek-
ing to identify weaknesses in anonymization techniques
in order to strengthen data protection, rather than to
exploiting the weaknesses to the detriment of research
participants (Yakowitz 2015). Rogue actors in the infor-
mal economy, at least for the moment, prefer access to
identified, raw data and to large clinical data sets. But
incentives and targets can change quickly. For the mo-
ment the effort required to breach research data sets
seems not to be worth the effort, but if the healthcare
data repositories that are currently besieged substantially
increase their security practices, research data sets may
suddenly become the most compelling health data
target.
II. Proponents of Criminalizing Wrongful
Re-identification
The weaknesses of traditional anonymization tech-
niques have incited a flurry of activity seeking to craft
alternative technical, organizational, and regulatory data
protection solutions. This article focuses on one type of
proposed solution, namely criminal sanctions against
inappropriate re-identification.
Asmentioned in the introduction, a striking feature of
this trend is the variety of adherents it has attracted.
Discussions about privacy and Big Data include both
privacy protectors on one side and promoters of Big
Data Benefits on the other. Yet, advocates of criminal-
izing re-identification transcend the two sides of this
debate.
The earliest explicit published call for such penalties
may beOhm’s 2010 landmark review of anonymization,
which made only a cursory call in response to the
identified shortcomings for Badditional safeguards and
accountability mechanisms … [f]or example … new
sanctions—possibly even criminal punishment—for
those who reidentify^ (Ohm 2010, 1770).
A more sustained proposal came the following year
(Gellman 2011), when privacy consultant Robert
Gellman drew on the earlier Beyond the HIPAA Privacy
Rule report, which had advocated for Blegal sanctions
[generally] to prohibit unauthorised reidentification^
(Nass et al. 2009, 281). That report in turn drew its
inspiration (Nass et al. 2009) from a report commis-
sioned by the U.K. Prime Minister on secondary use
(Thomas and Walport 2008).
Gellman’s article included model statutory provi-
sions (Gellman 2011, 55–61) that would create a felony
offence for wilful or attempted re-identification. His
offence applies only to entities3 that enter into a data-
access agreement in which they explicitly and irrevoca-
bly consent to accept the potential to be held liable for
the offence. The provisions include other data protection
safeguards, such as requiring the entity to Bpromptly
report any breach of [such] a data agreement^
(Gellman 2011, 58). Daniel Barth-Jones, an infectious
disease epidemiologist, soon reiterated the aspiration to
see criminal re-identification penalties passed in the
United States (Barth-Jones 2012, 14).
Later in the same year that Gellman’s article was
published, a proposal from law professor Jane Yakowitz
argued instead for a broader scope of liability (Yakowitz
2011). She would not limit the application of a re-
identification offence to those who explicitly undertake
to subject themselves to it, but instead to any Badversary
[who] discloses the identity and a piece of non-public
3 And, to be precise, to others closely related to them, including their
agents and employees.
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information to one other person who is not the data
producer^ (Yakowitz 2011, 48). As broadened liability
dramatically expands the risk of encompassing the re-
searchers who study re-identification risk in order to
strengthen, rather than compromise, the systems,
Yakowitz would seek to avoid criminalizing these re-
searchers by promoting a liability approach limiting
criminal offences to wilful instances of such disclosures
(Yakowitz 2011, 48–49). Appropriately carving out
these exceptions has proven to be a challenging feat.
Yakowitz’s approach does not seem to encompass ma-
licious actors who disclose their re-identification meth-
od without any person’s identity itself, for example,
which conceptually leads to results that are just as harm-
ful or worse. But the dilemma is that if the offence’s
scope is broadened so as to punish disclosure of re-
identificationmethods themselves, this inescapably con-
stitutes a direct attack on researchers.
In 2016, the third Caldicott report in the United
Kingdom pushed the criminalization envelope further
still (National Data Guardian for Health and Care 2016).
Rather than limiting liability to intentional or even reck-
less acts of re-identification, in order to restore trust in
anonymization, the report advocates for the adoption of
Bcriminal penalties for deliberate and negligent re-
identification of individuals^ (National Data Guardian
for Health and Care 2016, 8, emphasis added). Protec-
tion of important security research is particularly chilled
when faced with broad and vague criminal prohibitions
that potentially to include work to strengthen and test
anonymization techniques.
Lawmakers in the United Kingdom have now taken
up a similar approach. In a statement of intent regarding
the legislative revisions the country will make in light
of the European Union’s landmark General Data Pro-
tection Regulation, they laid out their intent to B[c]reate
a new [criminal] offence of intentionally or recklessly
re-identifying individuals from anonymized or
pseudonymised data^ whose maximum penalty will
be an unlimited fine (U.K. Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport 2017, 10).
Law professor Jorge Contreras has proposed ap-
plying re-identification sanctions to genetic informa-
tion specifically, including Bcivil penalties, damages,
and possibly criminal prosecution,^ which Bwould go
a long way toward preventing many of the nefarious
uses of genetic information that privacy advocates
fear^ (Contreras 2016, 46). He does not elaborate
on how the preventive function would operate and
on the contrary observes that a mechanism to mon-
itor violations of the prohibition would prove elusive
because the institutional entities tasked with
reviewing research projects for ethics compliance
Bcannot be viewed as objective watchdogs of re-
search conduct^ and because the other potential
monitor, namely a Bgovernmental monitoring and
enforcement function … does not exist today and
is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future^
(Contreras 2016, 49).
Other jurisdictions seeking to stem wrongful re-
identification are exploring an approach that bears
some similarity to that proposed by Gellman but that
instead leaves criminal liability entirely behind in
favour of a pure licensing arrangement between pri-
vate parties.4 A 2014 report of France’s Senate, for
example, recommends an Bopen data licence^ that
would Bexpressly forbid any abusive reuse that would
result in removing data’s anonymity^ and would in-
clude Ba clause to legitimately suspend the right to
reuse, and to erase or repatriate compromised data
sets when a re-identification risk emerges^ (Gorce
and Pillet 2014, 66, author’s translation). Quebec’s
data protection authority has drawn inspiration from
this approach but emphasises that although licensing
government data to a specific researcher offers a
certain amount of protection, Bthe dissemination of
the same data bank to the general public, in an open
format, absent any limitation respecting its use obvi-
ously entails a much greater re-identification risk^
and thus it suggests imposing more restrictive licenses
in such cases (Commission d’accès à l’information du
Québec 2016, 159, author’s translation).
Examples of recent exploration of the criminal re-
identification zeitgeist are readily available in other ju-
risdictions, notably New Zealand (New Zealand Data
Futures Forum 2014) and Canada (Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2016). The criminal
re-identification offence before the Australian Parliament
is addressed separately and in detail below in Part VI.
4 This proposed licensing scheme is distinct from the longstanding
requirement in some countries that personal data processing is made
subject to an approved license for that purpose issued by data protec-
tion authorities. The proposed scheme does not involve approval from
a public authority but is based instead on the idea that a private party
would make data available subject to the acceptance of a license that it
imposes, which would prohibit attempts at re-identification and likely
provide for sanctions in the case of noncompliance with that condition.
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III. Are Specific Rules Prohibiting Wrongful
Re-identification Necessary?
Before assessing the implications of criminal forms of
liability, it is important to address the significance of
explicit rules to prevent re-identification in general.
In many respects, data protection law has remained
remarkably consistent since its emergence in the early
1970s, despite ongoing revolutions in data processing
and its relation to human activity that have repeatedly
emerged in the interim. One of the most remarkable
examples of regulatory consistency is the OECD’s pub-
lication in 2013 of a revision of its 1980 Privacy Guide-
lines, the latter having had a difficult-to-overstate influ-
ence on global data protection law, in which the eight data
protection principles that formed the core of the initial
guidelines were retained in their entirety (OECD 2013).
This is not to say that a number of significant changes
have not taken place nor that a number of new data
protection notions have not evolved. Breach notification
rules, for example, have emerged around the world out
of data subjects’ more general rights to informed con-
sent and to information about how their data are proc-
essed. The right to erasure in article 17 of the European
Union’s newGeneral Data Protection Regulation, a less-
widely accepted new data protection principle, grew out
of the data subject’s right to rectification.
But explicit prohibition of re-identification is gener-
ally put forward without reference to existing data pro-
tection principles. Before adopting a new principle of its
own kind, it would first be helpful to define its concep-
tual relationship with the existing framework.
A common—perhaps even defining—feature of data
protection law, are restrictions on the collection, use,
disclosure, and transfer of personal data. A general rule
generally requires that such forms of processing be
limited to the purposes for which the data was collected
or to which the data subject has consented.
Where a deliberate attempt has been made to
anonymize personal data but the attempt is legally
inadequate to remove its personal character, the data
remains subject to general data protection norms and
malicious re-identification should thus generally con-
stitute an improper use of personal data, as it is
manifestly contrary to the purposes of the entity
who attempted to anonymize it. Where an
anonymization process is successful according to
the legal standard, yet data is nonetheless re-identi-
fied, for example by means that could not reasonably
have been foreseen, the re-identification should thus
generally constitute an improper collection of what
has now become personal data, as the collection was
equally manifestly contrary to the purpose of
anonymization.
As such, existing data protection frameworks seem-
ingly already regulate wrongful re-identification, and
new provisions may overlap with them. One potential
advantage of making penalties for wrongful re-
identification explicit is just that: they might serve the
purpose of providing specific notice that this behaviour
will not be tolerated. As an illustration, data-use agree-
ments generally require researchers to explicitly under-
take not to attempt to re-identify the data provided, and
clearly an agreement prohibiting re-identification only
indirectly by referring to improper Buse^ or Bcollection^
of the data would be much less transparent. But it does
not follow that creating a distinct prohibition on re-
identification is the only, or even the best, way to notify
those subject to the law that it requires that they not do
so.
The potential harm in this approach, beyond adding
incoherence to data protection law, is that it risks
circumventing the current debate in data protection
around the appropriate degree of emphasis on data use.
One recent proposal associated with Big Data Benefits
argues that data protection’s traditional concern with col-
lection, disclosure, and transfer of personal data should be
dramatically reduced or abandoned altogether and that the
focus should instead lie exclusively with robust regulation
of improper use of personal data (Cate and Mayer-
Schönberger 2013). A leading example of this approach
is a 2014 White House report that argued restrictions on
collection, storage, and retention are Bunlikely to be scal-
able over time^ and are damaging to Big Data (President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2014,
50). Others have argued that this shift is already a fait
accompli in that the principle that requires that the smallest
feasible amount of personal data be collected and used,
B[d]ata minimization[,] is simply no longer the market
norm^ (Tene and Polonetsky 2013, 260).
A cousin to this approach, advocated by former Es-
tonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, abandons tradi-
tional data protection altogether in favour of what he
calls Bdata integrity.^ Authorities have unrestricted ac-
cess to records in the national database but with a
safeguard that is built on BBlockchain-like principles^
ensuring that a person’s data can be neither accessed nor
modified without notifying them (Keen 2016).
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Emphasis on use restrictions is resisted by privacy
protection advocates. Helen Nissenbaum deems this dra-
matic departure from core data protection principles as
BBig Data exceptionalism^ (Nissenbaum 2016). The
power held by data controllers over data subjects, irre-
spective of whether they use it, is the problem. The
approach is, in fact, similar to the NSA’s redefinition of
Bcollection^ so as to exclude the control it gains of
personal data until that data is looked at (Schneier 2013).
The rationale for focusing on use is also strikingly
similar to that of shifting focus to improper re-identifi-
cation. Despite the argument above holding that re-
identification can constitute collection, outside of the
idiosyncrasies of data protection law’s notion of person-
al data, it is essentially a use of data. Criminalization
advocates argue that enacting re-identification offences
would allow more widespread disclosure, collection,
and transfer of ostensibly anonymized data because it
would be illegal to use it in a privacy infringing way.
The trend thus corresponds almost precisely with a
focus on use or, if one prefers, Big Data exceptionalism.
The conscription of explicit re-identification prohibi-
tions outside of debates around use but that nonetheless
risk indirectly resolving it, should be avoided. The
strongest and most apparent reason to be cautious of
the prospects for protecting privacy exclusively through
regulation of data uses, and a main reason that data
protection has always cast its net more widely, is that
the approach Bis challenging to enforce because the uses
of data cannot always be detected^ (Naveed et al. 2015,
9), as the following two Parts explore further.
IV. Does Criminal Prohibition Provide Greater
Protection in Terms of its Scope of Application?
The discussion above in Part II of the proposals of Jane
Yakowitz and of Quebec’s data protection authority
raises an important factor being relied upon in support
of recourse to the criminal law, namely its scope of
application. For data sets that will be accessed by a
limited number of researchers, contractual data-use
agreement undertakings not to attempt to re-identify
data may suffice, provided that effective monitoring of
sanctions for breach is in place. But broad or blanket
criminal liability may seem to have greater appeal to
achieve deterrence where data is publicly released or
made freely available for download. The same may be
true where there is a risk that the data will end up in the
hands of third parties to whom no data-use agreement
can apply and where there may even be no way to
identify a party to the agreement whose actions allowed
the wrongdoer to come into possession of the data.
Another way in which the broader scope of the
criminal law might promote data protection is on the
question of proving harms. Plaintiff proof of tangible
harm resulting from a data protection violation poses
notorious difficulties in private law actions, as illustrated
in the United States Supreme Court Spokeo case
(Spokeo, Inc. v Robins 136 S. Ct. 1540 [2016]). The
representative plaintiff in the Spokeo class action
complained that a consumer reporting agency had built
a profile on him containing inaccurate information that it
then sold to a variety of users including prospective
employers. The court held that irrespective of whether
the company’s disclosures violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the complainant lacked standing to bring
the claim unless he proved he had suffered a Bconcrete
and particularized^ harm as a result.
Migrating the privacy analysis to the field of criminal
law eliminates the risk that privacy violators escape
consequences simply because they result in harm that
is difficult to legally prove, while also sidestepping the
tendency of judicial decision-makers toward avoiding
granting awards in damages to plaintiffs when they
would amount to a windfall, with little relationship to
the harm they actually suffered.
But the criminal law and its procedure may ultimately
introduce more gaps in the scope of its coverage than it
can close. Re-identification, for example, may be no less
harmful when it is carried out by a wrongdoer who is
outside the national jurisdiction where the offence is in
force, yet in such cases it is even less likely to give rise to
an enforceable penalty than are private law obligations.
A range of procedural and substantive safeguards also
apply in the criminal context to protect the interest in
liberty that further limits the scope of application. Of-
fences based on negligence, that require no wrongful
intention at all, such as that proposed in the Caldicott
report (National Data Guardian for Health and Care
2016, 8), and particularly offences that do not even
require voluntariness, are less likely to be ultimately
enforceable, as they run contrary to longstanding crimi-
nal law protections. Similarly, each essential element of
any offence will generally need to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than on a balance of probabili-
ties, which will further reduce the situations in which a
criminal sanction will ultimately be applied.
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Criminal cases tend to be procedurally more compli-
cated and thus challenging to conduct, which allow the
potential to escape liability in the case of well-resourced
defendants or poorly resourced prosecutors. In Europe,
for example, Bone needs to work with victims, data
protection authorities (DPAs), police, prosecutors and
criminal courts, whereas in administrative law, most
roles are played by the data protection authorities (deci-
sion to investigate, decision to prosecute and decision to
sanction) and the administrative courts (a posteriori
controls)^ (De Hert and Boulet 2016, 364).
Worse yet, the criminal law’s tendency to reject com-
pelled self-incrimination is increasingly at odds with
contemporary data protection law, which has been deci-
sively progressing toward controller transparency in
jurisdictions around the globe, notably duties to notify
data protection authorities or data subjects of any data
breach that they suffer. These obligations flow directly
from the difficulty in even detecting improper uses of
data and the fundamental importance to the integrity of
any data protection regime that such undetected depar-
tures from the framework’s dictates be limited.
If data controllers are legally required to report any
data protection breach, and criminal re-identification
constitutes or is related to such a breach, then regimes
will run afoul of the prohibition against re-identification.
In some jurisdictions, the criminal sanction may then be
unenforceable against the self-reporting wrongdoer.
The current trend toward heavier breach notification
duties is so strong that law and policymakers even
appear willing to allow them to override the possibility
of imposing sanctions for the same behaviour In this
vein, some have argued that criminal data protection
sanctions actually strengthen breach notification rules
by introducing the threat of criminal punishment only
for breaches for which notification was not given
(Hengesbaugh, Stoker, and Krone 2011). For reasons
explored in the following part, making use of the crim-
inal sanction in this way appears dubious, and at a
minimum the implications of the privilege against self-
incrimination and other scoping considerations merit
careful consideration.
Yet, a final ostensible benefit of criminal sanctions
over contractual arrangements between data stewards
and researchers is that the criminal law is publicly
visible and gives research participants knowledge of
the content of their legal rights and protections and
limited means to exercise them. Indeed, data subjects’
right to transparent and effective forms of administrative
or judicial redress have been increasingly recognized
since being affirmed in the EU Court of Justice’s
Schrems case, which was infamous for having rescinded
the determination that the U.S.–E.U. Safe Harbor frame-
work provided adequate data protection (Schrems v
Data Protection Commissioner (C-362/14) [2015]
ECJ, ¶90). But extending rights to data subjects might
be better achieved through strengthening the data-use
agreements themselves, which data stewards should
make transparent to data subjects, and which should
ideally confer common data subject rights such rights
of access, notice, redress, portability, and rectification.
V. Does Criminal Prohibition Provide Greater
Protection through More Severe Penalties?
Advocates of criminal re-identification sanctions seldom
explicitly state the rationale underpinning their recourse
to that particular mode of liability rather than, for exam-
ple, an administrative law solution. They appear to be
grounded in a mindset that envisions increasing intensity
of punishment causing a corresponding increase to the
prohibition’s deterrent effect and thus ensuring robust
privacy protection or at least public confidence in such
protection. Since the goal is maximum privacy through
deterrence, their sights seem to be set on the most intense
sanction that the law provides, namely criminal liability,
sometimes even in its own most intense form, namely a
felony or indictable offence. This corresponds with a
Btough on crime^ approach. Who would risk jail time
just to manipulate data?
This common-sense assumption is the weakest as-
pect of criminal re-identification offence, as it lacks a
basis in evidence, paralleling failed experiments with
mandatory minimum penalties (Tonry 2009). The
evidence-based cynicism of veteran experts in the field
is illustrated by a leading Canadian textbook on criminal
sentencing, which states in its opening sentence that
Bnothing we do or have done has any significant effect
on the problem of crime^ (Ruby, Chan, and Hassan
2012, 1), suggesting that solving such problems is never
as simple as simply adopting severe penalties.
The experience of reluctant and uneven application
of mandatory minimum sentences is consistent with that
of criminal law offences in the field of data protection.
Prosecutions are rare. The United States’ HIPAA Priva-
cy Rule has seen fewer than two dozen criminal en-
forcement proceedings in its history (McGee 2015). In
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the European Union, Bthe criminal law [data protection]
provisions in countries where they exist are seldom
used,^ perhaps because B[t]urning to criminal law im-
plies that the data protection authorities lose control of a
case^ (De Hert and Boulet 2016, 365). It is neither
surprising nor objectionable that they would be reluctant
to turn this control over to decision-makers without data
protection expertise. In countries whose data protection
regimes opt for extensive criminalization, such as Bel-
gium, in practice these proceedings bear much more
resemblance to administrative law, as they privilege
fines over imprisonment and data protection authorities
prefer to retain control (De Hert and Boulet 2016). A
rare case in Italy in which three Google executives were
sentenced to six months suspended sentences for priva-
cy violations was later overturned by the country’s
Supreme Court (out-law.com 2014).
Sanctions for data misuse do, in some cases, need to
be increased. For example, often the only sanction for
improper re-identification of participants by researchers
in existing data transfer or access contractual agree-
ments is the possibility that the researcher will have their
right to use and access the research data set revoked in
the future. Although the impact this may have on their
research and reputation may be more than trivial, it
provides an insufficient guarantee of privacy to partici-
pants. However, to make the tremendous jump from this
existing lax sanction to a felony crime would introduce a
disproportionate sanction to the law that would be coun-
terproductive to its consistent application.
In short, deterrence may be more effectively
achieved by ensuring consistency, so that any viola-
tion that occurs will inescapably result in a mean-
ingful penalty, rather than by seeking to ensure that
violations have some remote chance of resulting in
an especially severe penalty (Kuner 2013, 154).
Criminal or regulatory norms that apply only to
entities with a measure of institutional cohesion and
thus accountability, and whose violations are relative-
ly easily identifiable, such as insurers and employers
who are subject the US Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act of 2008, achieve much more wide-
spread compliance than norms that apply to the
population-at-large when violations cannot readily
be traced to an individual or perhaps even identified,
such as online sharing of copyrighted media. It is
crucial not to lose sight of this potential disparity
between law and practice while making policy
around identifiability.
The European Court of Justice, however, appears to
have done just that in its recent Breyer decision (Breyer
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-582/14) [2016] ECJ).
The case turned on whether a set of collected dynamic
IP addresses were identifiable. The Advocate General’s
opinion in the case held that the literal interpretation of
Recital 26 of the E.U.’s Data Protection Directive,
which states that determinations of identifiability must
take into account the Bmeans likely reasonably to be
used… by any other person^ is too strict (¶ 64). Instead,
third parties with the necessary data to re-identify the
data need not be taken into account when the eventuality
of it being used to that end is prohibited by law (¶ 68).
The Court accepted this interpretation but found that on
the facts, the existence of extraordinary legal channels
prevented the data from being anonymized (¶ 68). The
Court’s reasoning, however, neglects the possibility that
an illegal activity might nonetheless remain widespread
in practice. It is troubling for the law to deem data to be
anonymized based only on a legal re-identification pro-
hibition absent any evidence that the rule enjoys wide-
spread adherence in practice.
Criminal re-identification penalties that target the
population at large are unlikely to readily identify
malfeasors, who can have relatively accessible means
at their disposal to ensure their own anonymity. In
advocating for such penalties, Yakowitz herself ac-
knowledges that Bdetection and enforcement … would
no doubt be very difficult^ yet defends them on the basis
that the disincentives wouldn’t necessarily Bhave no
effect^ (Yakowitz 2011, 50). Re-identification penalties
that instead target a specific segment of the population,
such as institutional researchers, will be generally be
unable to provide greater capacity for deterrence than
more targeted approaches such as undertakings in data-
use agreements.
VI. Case Study: Australia’s Proposed
Re-identification Offence
Recent legislative developments in Australia may lead
to a real-world test of the considerations described
above.
In summer 2016, under a Creative Commons licence,
the government published a research data set comprised
of Medicare patient data collected between 1984 and
2014 containing a random sample of 10 per cent of
patients. This data set had first undergone a Bsuite of
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confidentiality measures including encryption, perturba-
tion and exclusion of rare events has been applied to
safeguard personal health information and ensure that
patients and providers cannot be re-identified^ (Austra-
lian Government 2016, ¶2). The publication detailed the
methodology used to encrypt patient and service pro-
vider ID numbers to allow subsequent linkage while
preventing re-identification.
On 12 September, a group of academics from the
University of Melbourne privately informed the govern-
ment that it had been able to decrypt—in other words, to
re-identify—every service provider ID in the data set.
The government immediately withdrew the data set
from the website where it had been posted. Although
the logs indicated that it had been downloaded 1,500
times, there was no way to determine who had
downloaded it, nor to whom it may have been disclosed
in the interim (Middleton 2016).
On 28 September, the Attorney-General announced
his intention to amend the Privacy Act 1988 both to
create a criminal offence for wrongful re-identification
of such data, as well as for this amendment to apply
retroactively to that same day (Brandis 2016). At least
one newspaper appears to have understood the new
prohibition to have already entered into force (Spooner
and Towell 2016). The significance of this date is that it
directly precedes the academics’ publication of their re-
identification findings and general methodology
(Culnane, Rubinstein, and Teague 2016a).
On 5 October, a public government database with
details on 96,000 public servants was removed due to fears
the Banonymized^ data was re-identifiable (Towell 2016).
By 12 October, the promised amendments to the
Privacy Act 1988 had been introduced in the Senate
for first reading as the Privacy Amendment (Re-
identification Offence) Bill 2016 along with an ex-
planatory memorandum explicitly citing the U.K.
Caldicott report, mentioned above in Part II of this
article, as a source of inspiration. Consistent with
earlier initiatives the stated objective of the bill is
to take Bfull advantage of the opportunities that new
technology creates to improve research and policy
outcomes^ (Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, Senate 2016, ¶2). Timothy Pilgrim, who
is Australia’s Information Commissioner and Privacy
Commissioner, publicly bolstered the bill in an arti-
cle asserting that B[d]e-identification is a smart and
contemporary response to the privacy challenges of
data^ (Pilgrim 2016, ¶7).
The bill’s four key components are, first, a new section
16CA, which lifts certain blanket exemptions from lia-
bility Bdue to the need for a general deterrent^ that the
Privacy Act 1988 would otherwise apply to individuals
and contractors. Second, section 16D criminalizes re-
identification, making it an offence to intentionally re-
identify data that was published by a government agency
on the basis that it was de-identified for use by the general
public, with a few exceptions. Third, section 16E crimi-
nalizes the intentional disclosure of such data even if the
re-identification was itself unintentional, so long as it is
known have occurred, again with a few exceptions.
Finally, section 16F provides for a non-criminal penalty
for failing to notify the agency of having re-identified the
data, again, even if the re-identification was unintention-
al, so long as it was known to have occurred. Each of the
criminal offences carry a penalty of imprisonment of up
to two years or 120 Australian penalty units, which in this
context amounts to $13,200 AUD. Section 16G appears
to envision exceptions for research purposes, but these
are limited to seemingly ad hoc exceptions approved by
ministerial discretion, in consultation with the Informa-
tion Commissioner.
Despite the stated intention of the bill’s drafters to
avoid catching re-identification researchers within the
scope of the penalty, it is unclear what is excluded. The
University of Melbourne researchers warned that if the
Brules had been in place in September, we might not
have identified the problem in the … encryption, the
data set would still be online, and the government would
be unaware of its insecurity^ (Culnane, Rubinstein, and
Teague 2016b, ¶7). The irony of re-identification of-
fences in general, they add, is that B[u]sually, acts that
are impossible don’t need to be banned^ (Culnane,
Rubinstein, and Teague 2016b, ¶2).
The explanatory memorandum includes a required
analysis of the bill’s compatibility with human rights,
including a justification of the bill’s reverse onus on
defendants requiring them to prove that one of the bill’s
exceptions applies to them, which infringes on the pre-
sumption of innocence (Parliament of the Common-
wealth of Australia, Senate 2016, ¶39–43) and the pro-
hibition on retroactive criminal law (¶44–51). The mem-
orandum failed to analyse, however, the conformity of
the combination of bill’s re-identification notification
duty and its criminal re-identification offence with the
privilege against self-incrimination, which is incorpo-
rated in Australian law through Article 14(3)(g) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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The rushed time constraints in which the legislative
tests were conceived show. The explanatory memoran-
dum needs further work, and the protections afforded to
security researchers remain unclear. But these concerns
are ancillary to the central question, which is whether the
government objective of turning back the clock to the
moment the data was thought to be robustly anonymized
can be achieved or significantly furthered, through crim-
inal re-identification offences. Can the threat of such
offences really restore the privacy of those Medicare
patients whose datawas included in the 1,500 downloads?
For the reasons addressed earlier in this article, the
proposition appears dubious. It is unclear that any oc-
currence of attempted or actual re-identification would
be detected. Even if detected, a person sufficiently so-
phisticated to re-identify would quite plausibly take
steps to prevent their own identification. If that wrong-
doer was nonetheless identified, any of a number of
procedural or substantive limits on the scope of the
criminal law might frustrate a prosecution.
In sum, the notion that criminal re-identification
sanctions provide legal protection that is comparable to
the technical protection provided by provable
anonymization is dangerously misleading.
Conclusion
In this article, we charted developments underpinning
the wave of interest in criminalizing re-identification of
personal data. We raised several conceptual concerns
associated with this movement, namely that it is unclear
what criminalization adds to already-existing data pro-
tection tools including those described above in Part III
and that it may have the perverse result of adding uncer-
tainty and incoherence to both law and Big Data practice.
Although the strategy can initially appear to be an
appealing means to dispose of a pernicious problem, by
providing public perception and seeming reassurance of
deterrence, it should be approached with caution. The
vast majority of criminal re-identification’s proponents
have addressed the topic in only a cursory manner. Even
the few somewhat more sustained analyses, such as
those provided by Gellman and in the Australian Bill,
leave a number of the concerns and considerations
raised by this article unaddressed or poorly addressed.
None of this is to say that existing approaches to data
protection enforcement are adequate. To the contrary,
throughout the world, enforcement likely remains the
field’s least successful area (see e.g. Kuner 2013).
For the time being, as suggested by Part IV, the path
to achieving consistent and reliable scope of data pro-
tection enforcement could be approached by strength-
ening data protection authorities’ capacity, resources,
and jurisdiction to undertake enforcement action and
to abandon solely complaints-based enforcement action
in favour of an approach that includes proactive inves-
tigation and monitoring. In addition, enhanced monitor-
ing mechanisms and data-subject rights in data-use
agreements also merit further exploration.
Finally, as indicated in Part V, sanctions should be
proportionate to deter violations and should not be prac-
tically stymied by imposing an onerous or insurmount-
able burden on plaintiffs to prove concrete injury. They
may be community-based, where, for instance, genomic
data custodians report misuse to ethics committees, the
wrongdoer’s institution, or journals (Joly, Zeps, and
Knoppers 2011). Regarding legal sanctions, the general
approach of the new E.U. Regulation in its Article 83
provides a helpful example in this respect in prioritizing
administrative fines that must be designed to be
Beffective, proportionate and disuasive^ (¶1) and in
allowing sufficient flexibility by providing for a maxi-
mum of €20 million or 4 per cent of annual revenues,
whichever is greater (¶5).
Law and policy must provide appropriate redress
when wrongful re-identification occurs, by deterring
the behaviour and by compensating those who are
harmed. But criminal sanctions appear to be a dispro-
portionate means to this end, particularly because ear-
nest attempts at achieving consistent enforcement
through meaningful yet less drastic deterrents have gen-
erally not yet been earnestly mobilized. Finally, law and
policymakers should reconsider the direction taken by
the European Union’s Breyer decision and the proposed
Australian amendments and instead treat with scepti-
cism any approach that casts legal provisions allowing
severe and blanket punishment as the functional equiv-
alent of mathematically provable anonymization tech-
niques, which lead data protection and Big Data down a
dangerous path.
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